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ABSTRACT
In the past few years, semi-fragile watermarking has
become increasingly important as it can be used to verify
the content of images and to localise the tampered areas,
while tolerating some non-malicious manipulations. In the
literature, the majority of semi-fragile algorithms have
applied a predetermined threshold to tolerate errors caused
by lPEG compression. However, this predetermined
threshold is typically fixed and cannot be easily adapted to
different amounts of errors caused by unknown lPEG
compression at different quality factors (QFs) applied to the
watermarked images. In this paper, we analyse the
relationship between QF and threshold, and propose the use
of generalised Benford's Law as an image forensics
technique for semi-fragile watermarking, to accurately
detect the unknown QF of the images. The results obtained
show an overall average QF correct detection rate of
approximately 99% when 5% of the pixels are subjected to
image content tampering, as well as compression using
different QFs (ranging from 95 to 65). Consequently, our
proposed image forensics method can adaptively adjust the
threshold for images based on the estimated QF, therefore,
improving the accuracy rates in authenticating and
localising the tampered regions for semi-fragile
watermarking.
Index Terms-Semi-fragile Watermarking,
Generalised Benford's Law, nCT, lPEG Compression,
Image Authentication
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the popularity and affordability of advanced
digital image editing tools, allow users to manipulate images
relatively easily and professionally. Consequently, the proof
of authenticity of digital images has become increasingly
challenging and difficult. Moreover, image authentication
and forensics techniques have recently attracted much
attention and interest from the Police, particularly in law
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enforcement applications such as crime scene investigation
and traffic enforcement applications.
Semi-fragile watermarking has been used to
authenticate and localise malicious tampering of image
content, while permitting some non-malicious or
unintentional manipulations. These manipulations can
include some mild signal processing operations such as
those caused by transmission and storage of lPEG images.
In the literature, a significant amount of research has been
focused on the design of semi-fragile algorithms that could
tolerate lPEG compression and other common non-
malicious manipulations [1-7]. However, watermarked
images could be compressed by unknown lPEG QFs. As a
result, in order to authenticate the images, these algorithms
have to set a pre-determined threshold that could allow them
to tolerate different QF values when extracting the
watermarks.
The art of determining the threshold values for
semi-fragile watermarking schemes has been extensively
documented by several researchers. In this paper, we
review three common approaches. The first approach uses a
threshold for authenticating each block of the image [2] [4].
In this scheme, if a block of correlation coefficients cr
(between the extracted watermark w' and its corresponding
original watermark w) is smaller than threshold r , this
block is classified as a tampered block, and vice versa. This
is represented in equation (1):
cr(w,w')<r, max(r)-r=TM (1)
where max (r) is the maximum threshold value with
W = w' , and TM is the lPEG compression tolerance
margin. We discuss this approach in more detail in the next
section. The second approach uses a threshold which has
been pre-determined during the watermark embedding
process [3] [4]. An example is illustrated in Figure 1, where
the watermarks Ware embedded into each side of threshold
t according to the watermark value (e.g. 0 or 1), by shifting
or substituting the corresponding coefficient. The value of
T and - T controls the perceptual quality of the
nsp 2009I
watermarked image. Threshold t is determined empirically
to detect the watermark while extracting the watermarks w' .
TM is the JPEG compression tolerance margin. If w' > t:
then w' = 1, otherwise w' = 0 [4].
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 demonstrates a simple semi-fragile watermarking
scheme to explain the relationship between threshold, QF,
missed detection rate and false alarm rate when
authenticating test images. Section 3 describes the
background of Benford's Law, generalised Benford's Law
and their relationship with the watermarked image, JPEG
compressed watermarked image. Section 4 describes the
proposed image forensics method and experimental results
are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents the
conclusion and future work.
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2. THRESHOLD IN SEMI-FRAGILE
WATERMARKING
2.1 Watermark embedding process
Figure 2 illustrates the watermark embedding process
As shown in Figure 2, the original image is divided
into non-overlapping sub-blocks of 8 x 8 pixels and DCT is
applied to each block.
Watermarked
image
In this section, the feasibility of our proposed method is
investigated in detail. By analysing the first approach
previously reviewed in [2] [4], a simple semi-fragile
watermarking algorithm based on discrete cosine transform
(DCT) and the importance of threshold is also described.
Original
image
The watermark embedding process is achieved by
modifying the random selected mid-frequency (shaded
blocks in Figure 3) of the DCT coefficients in each block as
follows:
{
caef ' (coef ~ T /\ W =I) v ( w ~ - T /\ W =-I)
caef'= a, (caef<T/\w=l) (3)
-a, (coef > T /\ W =-1)
where coef is the original DCT coefficient, coef I is the
modified DCT coefficient. W is the watermark bits
generated via a pseudo-random sequence (1 and -I) using a
secret key. T > 0 determines the perceptual quality of the
watermarked image and a E [T/2,T] is a constant. The
inverse DCT is then applied to each block to obtain the
watermarked image. Figure 3 illustrates examples of 8 x 8
DCT block with different watermark sequences and
embedding locations for each block.
The third approach uses a threshold for comparison
with the result of applying the Tamper Assessment Function
(TAF) during the authentication of images [7]. The
extracted watermarks w I and their corresponding original
watermarks Ware calculated by using TAF, as in equation
(2):
1 Nw
TAF( w,w') =-Iw(i) EEl w'(i) (2)
N w i=1
where N w is the length of the watermark. The TAF value is
compared with a threshold r , where O:s; t: :s; 1 .
If TAF(w, w') > r , then the watermarked image is
considered as a tampered image, otherwise it is not. The
tolerance margin can also be denoted as TM =1- r .
The thresholds t mentioned previously are pre-
determined which will result in some fixed tolerance
margins. A significant amount of research has been
dedicated to improving the watermark embedding
algorithms by analysing the characteristics of JPEG
coefficients of the compressed watermarked image [5-7].
Alternatively, Error Correction Coding (ECC) has been
used for improving watermark detection and authentication
rates [3].
However, the relationship between QF and
threshold has not been discussed in the literature. If the QF
could be estimated, then appropriate thresholds could be
adapted for each test image, before initialising the
watermark extraction and authentication process. The use of
Benford's Law has already been applied to image forensics
of JPEG compressed images [8]. In this paper, we analyse
the relationship between QF and threshold, and propose a
framework that further explores generalised Benford's Law
as an image forensics technique, in an effort to accurately
detect the unknown JPEG compression in semi-fragile
watermarking images.
Figure I illustrates the pre-determined threshold during the
watermark embedding process.
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Figure 3 illustrates examples of three 8 x 8 blocks for
watermark embedding
also leads to an increase in the false alarm rate. However, if
the threshold is set to be of a close proximity to -I, then
the missed detection rate increases and the false alarm rate
will decrease. This results in a dilemma in determining a
suitable threshold. For the proposed semi-fragile
watermarking scheme, the threshold is set as 0.5, which
provides a good trade-off between P; and PMD/I.
y
2.2 Watermark detection and authentication process
In Figure 4, the test image is first divided into non-
overlapping sub-blocks of 8 x 8 pixels, and DCT is then
applied to each block.
False
alarm rate
Missed
detection rate
-I 0 Threshold
Fig. 5. the relationship among threshold, ~; and PMD/I'
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Figure 6 illustrates the overall relationship between
threshold, PF and PMD/I for the proposed semi-fragile
watermarking scheme. The watermarked image 'Lena' has
been tampered with a rectangular block and lPEG
compressed at QF=75. Figure 6 (a) shows the pre-
determined threshold T = 0.5 used for authentication. The
authenticated image shows that the proposed semi-fragile
watermarking scheme can localise the tampered region with
reasonable accuracy, but with some false detection errors.
In Figures 6 (b) and 6 (c), the lower and upper
thresholds T = 0.3 and T = 0.7 were used for comparison,
respectively. Figure 6 (b) shows that the false alarm rate has
decreased whilst the missed detection rate has increased in
the authenticated image. Figure 6 (c) shows the image has a
lower missed detection rate but with a higher false alarm
rate. From this comparison, T = 0.5 was chosen for lPEG
compression at QF=75. However, if QF =95, then T = 0.5
may not be adequate as shown in Figure 7 (a). The missed
detection rate is higher than Figure 7 (b) with T = 0.9.
Therefore, it would be advantageous to be able to estimate
the QF of lPEG compression, so that an adaptive threshold
can be applied for increasing the authentication accuracy. In
this paper, we propose the use of generalised Benford's Law
to estimate the QF, and this will be explained in the next
section.
(6)
(5)
(4)
Original Watermark
1,---""----, Authenticated
image
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The watermark detection algorithm shown in
equation (4) is then applied.
w' ={I, coef '> 0
-1, coeJ' < 0
where w' is the extracted watermark bits and coeJ' is the
DCT coefficient of the test image. The extracted watermark
bits from each block are compared with its corresponding
original watermark Wbits to obtain the correlation
coefficient cr as shown in equation (5):
cr(w,w') = I(W'_;')(W-;)
~I(w'-wYI(w-wr
The correlation coefficient of each block is then compared
with a pre-determined threshold -1 ~ T ~ 1as below:
{
un - tampered , cr(w, w') :2: T
Block =
tampered, cr(w, w') < T
Key
Figure 4. An illustration of the watermark detection and
authentication processes.
2.3 The importance of threshold
The magnitude of threshold affects the false alarm rate (PF )
is the percentage of un-tampered blocks detected as
tampered and the missed detection rate (PMD/I) is the
percentage of tampered blocks detected as un-tampered.
Figure 5 shows that the missed detection rate
decreases if the threshold is in close proximity to I. This
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Different thresholds for QF=75
(c)
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Fig. 7. Different thresholds for QF=95
3. BENFORD'S LAW FOR SEMI-FRAGILE
WATERMARKING
3.1 Background of Benford's Law
Benford's Law was introduced by Frank Benford in 1938
[9] and then was developed by Hill [10] for analysis of the
probability distribution of the first digit (1-9) of the number
from natural data in statistics. Benford's Law has also been
applied to accounting forensics [II] [12]. Since the OCT
coefficients of a digital image obey Benford's Law, it has
recently attracted a significant amount of research interests
in image processing and image forensics [8] [13] [14]. The
basic principle of Benford's Law is given as follows:
P ( x ) = log., ( 1+ ~). x =1,2,K 9 (7)
where X is the first digit of the number and p (x) is the
probability distribution of X .
In contrast to digital image watermarking which is
an "active" approach by embedding bits into an image for
authentication, image forensics is essentially a "passive"
approach of analysing the image statistically to determine
whether it has been tampered with. Fu et al. [8] proposed a
generalised Benford's Law, used for estimating the QF of
the lPEG compressed image, as shown in equation (8).
p(x) =Nlog\O (1 +_I_q ) , X =I,2 ,K 9 (8)
s+x
where N is a normalisation, and sand q are model
parameters [8]. Their research indicated that the probability
distribution of the first digit of the lPEG coefficients obey
generalised Benford 's Law after the quantisation. Moreover,
the probability distributions were not following the
generalized Benford's Law if the image had been
compressed twice with different quality factors. Thus, by
utilizing this property, the QF of the image can be
estimated. In this paper, we propose to use generalised
Benford's Law for detecting unknown lPEG compression
QF to improve the authentication process, during the semi-
fragile watermarking authentication process.
3.2 Benford's Law, Generalised Benford's Law vs.
Watermarked images
The feasibility of generalised Benford's Law for use in
semi-fragile watermarking was first investigated. In our
experiment, we selected 1338 uncompressed grayscale
images from the Uncompressed Image Database (UClD)
[15] for analysis to ensure that there was no compression
performed on the images previously. Throughout this
section we adhere to the same terminology as used in [8],
where "Block-OCT coefficients" refers to the 8 x 8 block-
OCT coefficients before the quantisation, and "lPEG
coefficients" refers to the 8 x 8 block-OCT coefficients after
the quantisation.
Figure 8 illustrates the comparison between the
probability distribution of Benford's Law, mean distribution
of 151 digit of block-OCT coefficients of 1338 images and
the watermarked images. The average PSNR between the
original images and watermarked images was approximately
35.7IdB, which is considered to be of acceptable image
quality. Figure 8 shows that the distribution of the 151 digits
of the block-OCT coefficients for the uncompressed images
obeys Benford's Law closely. This was also observed by Fu
et al. in their analysis [8]. In terms of the watermarked
images, the mean distribution also follows Benford 's Law.
The mean standard deviations of the 1338 uncompressed
images and their watermarked images are considerably
small, as shown in Table 1. The average X 2 divergence [8]
for watermarked images is also small at 0.0115. This
indicates a good fitting between Benford's Law and
watermarked images. The X 2 divergence is shown in
equation (9).
2 ~ (Pi '- Pi)2
X =L. (9)
i=l Pi
where Pi' is the actual 151 digit probability of the OCT
coefficients of the watermarked images and Pi is the 151
digit probability from Benford's Law in equation (7).
Hence, the results indicated that the probability distribution
151 digits of the block-OCT coefficients of the watermarked
images follow Benford's Law. Figure 9 (a) illustrates an
example of 8 x 8 OCT coefficients . The 151 digits of the AC
coefficients are then extracted as shown in Figure 9 (b).
Figures 10-12 illustrate the comparisons between
the probability distribution of Benford's Law, generalized
Benford's Law and the mean distributions of the 151 digits of
block lPEG coefficients of the watermarked images
compressed at QF=lOO, 75, 50, respectively. Table II
summarises the mean standard deviations obtained for the
1338 original and watermarked images, lPEG compressed
at the three QF rates are considerably small. Furthermore, as
shown in TABLE III, the X2 divergences are also calculated
by using equation (9), where Pi I is the actual 151 digit
probability of the lPEG coefficients of the compressed
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TABLE 1
Mean standard deviation s of 1338 images
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Fig. 8. 1sl digit of block-OC T coefficients
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watermarked images, Pi is the 151 digit probability from
generalised Benford ' s Law in equation (8) and N, s and
q are model parameters gained from [8]. These results also
indicate the good fitting between generalized Benford 's
Law and watermarked images compressed with different
QFs, respectively.
The results indicated that the probability
distributions of the 151 digits of JPEG coefficients of the
watermarked images, in Figures 10-12, obey generalised
Benford 's Law model proposed by Fu et al. [8], in equation
(8). Hence, we could employ their model to estimate the
unknown QF of test images to adjust the threshold for
authentication. The improved authentication process is
described in next section.
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Fig. 11. 151 digit of JPEG coefficients (QF=75)
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4. THE IMPROVED AUTHENTICATION METHOD
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Fig. 13. Improved authentication process
The same test image is also used for detecting the
QF by the quality factor estimation process. This process
works by firstly classifying the test image as compressed or
uncompressed by adapting from [8]. If the test image has
been compressed, the test image is then recompressed with
the largest QF, from QF=100 to QF=50, in decreasing steps
of 5. We decrease in steps of 5 as this gives us the most
frequently used quality factors for lPEG compressed images
(i.e. 95%, 90%, 85% etc.). For each compressed test image,
the probability distribution of the l" digits of lPEG
coefficients is obtained. Each set of values are then analysed
by employing the generalized Benford's Law equation and
using the best curve-fitting to plot the data. In order to
obtain the goodness of fit, we calculate the sum of squares
due to error (SSE) of the recompressed images. We can
detect the QF of the test image by iteratively calculating the
SSE for all QFs (starting at QF=100, and decreasing in steps
of 5), and as soon as SSEs 10-6 , we have reached the
estimated QF for the test image. As per the pseudocode
below, the threshold 10-6 has been set to allow us to detect
the QF of the test image. This threshold value was reported
in [8], and has been verified by the results in our
experiment.
If SSE:::; 10-6
Then QF has been detected.
Break,
End
Figure 14 illustrates the results of estimating the
QF for a test image that has previously been compressed
with QF=70. Three curves have been drawn in order to fit
the three probability distribution data sets: generalized
Benford's Law for QF=70, the test image recompressed
with QF=70, and separately recompressed at QF=90. The
distribution of QF=90 shows the worst fit and is
considerably fluctuated, while the distribution ofQF=70 is a
generally decreasing curve, which also follows the trend of
generalized Benford Law. These results indicate that if the
test image has been double compressed without the same
quality factor, the probability distribution would not obey
the generalised Benford's Law.
Once the QF is estimated, the threshold T can be
adapted according to different estimated QFs, based on the
following conditions:
_ Benford's Law
o Generalised Benford's Law
_ Mean distribution of 1338 watermarked images
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In this section, we explain the improved authentication
process which uses the generalised Benford Law model. In
Figure 13, the test image is divided into non-overlapping
blocks of 8 x 8 pixels and OCT is then applied to each
block . The watermark detection process then extracts the
watermark bits using a secret key.
Fig. 12. 151 digit of lPEG coefficients (QF=50)
TABLE 11
Mean standard deviations of 1338 lPEG compressed images
Original images Watermarked images
1st QFIOO QF75 QF50 QFIOO QF75 QF50digit
1 0.0828 0.0327 0.0399 0.0664 0.0514 0.0509
2 0.0165 0.0067 0.0089 0.0122 0.0132 0.0149
3 0.0169 0.0066 0.0088 0.0143 0.0111 0.0112
4 0.0163 0.0058 0.0072 0.014 0.0082 0.0084
5 0.0142 0.0049 0.0059 0.0121 0.0064 0.0065
6 0.0123 0.0043 0.0048 0.0102 0.0052 0.0051
7 0.0107 0.0037 0.0039 0.0087 0.0042 0.0041
8 0.0094 0.0032 0.0033 0.0075 0.0035 0.0034
9 0.0084 0.0027 0.0027 0.0065 0.003 0.0028
TABLE 1lI
Average X 2 of 1338 compressed watermarked images
QF Model Parameters X2N q s
100 1.456 1.47 0.0372 0.0257
70 1.412 1.732 -0.337 0.0292
50 1.579 1.882 -0.2725 0.0166
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5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Fig. 15. Four types of test images with and without attacks
5 7
First digit
Fig. 14. Estimating the QF ofa watermarked image
the accuracy of the quality factor estimation process, each
test image has been blind compressed from QF=100 to
QF=50 in decreasing steps of 5. For each compression, the
quality factor estimation process was used to determine the
QF. The mean estimated QFs for all 1338 test images and
each correctly identified detection accuracy rate Pde for
each lPEG compression quality factor are shown in Table
IV, based on equation (11).
aP =- x 100% (11)
de fJ
where ais the number of correctly detected QF and f3 is
the number of images tested. The mean estimated QF results
indicate the QFs can be estimated with high accuracy. The
only exceptions for lower correct detection rates, Pde ' were
obtained for QF=50, QF=60 , and QF= I00. In the case of
QF=50, Pde was very low at approximately 18.2%,
meaning that the process was probably detecting QFs close
to QF=55. For QF=60 , and QF=100, the detection rates
were slightly better at 38.6% and 65.7%, respectively.
For comparison, both the mean estimated QF value
and correct detection rate were used for each result to
estimate the actual QF for the images. The QFs were then
grouped into three different ranges: QF ~ 90, 90 > QF > 75
and QF S 75. The grouping into three QF ranges did not
have an overall effect on the authentication process. Results
obtained for Pde2 also showed the correct detection
accuracy rates in these QF ranges were on average at 99%.
Table V summaries the results obtained for test
images that have been attacked via copy & paste and then
lPEG compressed. Each watermarked image has been
tampered randomly in different regions by applying a copy
& paste attack to 5% of the watermarked image (9830 pixels
in 384512 pixels image), and also compressed with different
QF values. The results showed that the quality factor
estimation process was highly accurate even under these
attacks.
From Table V, the lowest correct detection rates
were obtained for QF=50, QF=60, and QF=100. Two other
experiments were performed with the test image subjected
to only the copy & paste attack and with the test image
without any modification. The detected QFs achieved for
both experiments were approximately 99, and fit well in the
upper range ofQF ~ 90. Similarly, the results of Pde2 also
showed the correct detection rates in the three ranges were
highly accurate with an overall average of 99%. As such,
the threshold can be adapted into the three QF ranges
according to the estimated QF of each test image as
described in Section 4.
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Finally, the correlation coefficient between original
watermarks and extracted watermarks for each block is
compared using the attuned threshold T to authenticate, in
order to determine whether any blocks have been tampered
with. This is similar to the authentication process as
described in Section 2.
The watermarked images are generated by our proposed
semi-fragile watermarking algorithm (as discussed in
Section 2) using the 1338 test images from uelD [15]. In
order to achieve a fair comparison, different embedding
parameters are randomised for each image such as the
watermarks location, watermark string and watermark bits.
For our analysis, four types of test images with and without
attacks are considered as shown in Figure 15.
Table IV summaries the results obtained for test
images that have been lPEG compressed only. To evaluate
TABLE IV
lPEG compression only
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6. SUMMARY
TABLE V
Copy & paste (5%) + lPEG compression
Actual Mean
QF Estimated Pde T Pde2QF
100 98.60 72%
95 95.00 100% 0.9 99.1%
90 90.14 98.6%
85 84.83 97.9% 0.7 99.3%
80 79.95 99.6%
75 75.22 99.1%
70 69.87 99.5%
65 64.46 98.7% 0.5 99.2%60 61.54 63.9%
55 54.93 96.6%
50 53.32 20.4%
In this paper, we presented the relationship between QF and
threshold, and proposed a framework incorporating the
generalised Benford's Law as an image forensics technique
to accurately detect unknown lPEG compression levels in
semi-fragile watermarked images. We reviewed three
typical methods of employing predetermined thresholds in
semi-fragile watermarking algorithms and the limitations of
using predetermined thresholds were also highlighted.
In our proposed semi-fragile watermarking
method, the test image was first analysed to detect its
previously unknown quality factor for lPEG compression,
before proceeding with the semi-fragile authentication
process. The results showed that QFs can be accurately
detected for most unknown lPEG compressions. In
particular, the average QF detection rate was as high as 96%
for watermarked images compressed with QFs between 95-
65, and 99% when the image was subjected to tampering of
5% pixels of the image and compressed with QFs between
95-65. The threshold was adapted into three specific ranges
according to the estimated QF of each test image. For future
0.5 99.4%
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Pde2T
0.7 99.1%
0.9 98.8%
Actual Mean
QF Estimated PdeQF
100 98.16 65.7%
95 94.87 97.3%
90 90.06 98.2%
85 84.20 91.4%
80 79.77 97.5%
75 75.35 97.0%
70 69.77 98.8%
65 64.42 93.7%
60 62.42 38.6%
55 55.15 94.1%
50 54.25 18.2%
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